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Abstract  
South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation came with a promise for harmonized and peaceful 
living in South Africa. In this era where the Constitution reigns supreme, came hope for economic 
emancipation for many people, especially previously disadvantaged groups of people. The 
Constitution which enshrines the Bill of Rights embeds fundamental human rights, including 
labour rights which have the power to guarantee true economic emancipation for people in 
employment relationships. In an employment relationship, employees are inherently weaker and 
must be afforded protection by the law. Unfortunately, employees still face the risk of dismissals, 
unfair discrimination and unfair labour practices. The Labour Relations Act and the Employment 
Equity Act are two of the main pieces labour legislation enacted to give effect to the rights of 
employees in the workplace and to regulate the employment relationship. Discrimination in South 
Africa remains one of the challenges plaguing the nation and the workplace is no different. Where 
an employee or job seeker raises a claim of unfair discrimination against the employer, the 
employer can also raise certain defences to justify such discrimination. This is provided for in 
legislation. 
This study seeks to answer the question on what an inherent job requirement is and whether it is a 
legitimate defence against unfair discrimination. It is made up of 5 chapters which cover the 
introduction, a South African legal framework which includes a constitutional and legislative 
framework, an analysis of relevant South African case law, a comparative study looking at 
international and foreign law, as well as recommendations and a conclusion. 
The main aim of this study is to ascertain whether the approach currently adopted in dealing with 
matters of unfair discrimination in the workplace where the inherent job requirements is raised as 
a defence is sufficient in maintaining a balancing of interests of both employers and employees. 
This study will find that the current approach is insufficient and will seek to propose a new 
approach or improved approach that meets the objectives and purpose of not the Constitution but 
the Labour Relations Act and the Employment Equity Act. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Research question 
This minor dissertation critically examines and analyses the following question: what is the 
inherent job requirement and in what instances can it be used as a defence against unfair 
discrimination in the workplace? Can discrimination of an employee or job applicant based on 
listed grounds or on any other arbitrary grounds be justified if it is based on the so called ‘inherent 
job requirement’? 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
South Africa comes from an era of division widely known as apartheid. The apartheid system was 
heavily characterized by institutionalized discrimination which had devastating effects on the 
country and shaped the political, economic and social lives of all South African people.1Black 
(also refers to Africans, Indians, and Coloureds as per the definition in the Employment Equity 
Act) South Africans in particular, were the most disadvantaged and marginalized by this 
segregatory system. The apartheid system was primarily premised on inequality and racial 
discrimination with the effect that non-white races enjoyed little to no protection of rights, 
including labour rights.2 During this system, South Africa was identified as one of the most 
unequal societies in the world.3 The defeat of apartheid and the subsequent establishment of a 
“new” South Africa was hailed internationally as a miracle.4 However, the deep scars of this 
appalling system are still visible in the society.5 Today, many years after the abolishment of 
apartheid in South Africa, there are still cases of discrimination in the workplace. Notably, our 
 
1 Kasika The Defence of Inherent Requirements of the Job in Unfair Discrimination Cases (2006 thesis SA) 1. 
2 Dupper Essential Employment Discrimination law (2004) 1. 
3 Chaskalson “From wickedness to equality: The moral transformation of South African law” 2003 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 590 591. 
4 Cornell Law and Revolution in South Africa: uBuntu, Dignity and the Struggle for Constitutional Transformation 
(2014) 1. 
5 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 4 SA 197 (CC) par 217A-C.       
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Constitution recognizes that the systemic racial discrimination entrenched during apartheid 
requires positive action to achieve results.6 
In this constitutional dispensation where people enjoy constitutional rights, it is paramount that the 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are seen to be manifested. The new South Africa is founded 
on hopes for a democratic future based on national unity, reconciliation, a commitment to 
restructuring, development, human rights and equality.7 Part of this development and 
establishment of equality means centralizing labour rights. Our Constitution8 recognises labour 
rights in section 23 and affords Constitutional protection to such rights. The section guarantees the 
right to fair labour practices and that such right is implied into every aspect of the employment 
relationship. The employment relationship is an inherently unequal one that requires a constant 
balancing of interests that can be influenced by public policy. Since the advent of our constitutional 
democracy, public policy is now deeply rooted in our Constitution and the values that underlie it.9 
It can be said that public policy is a product of constitutional values and purports the notions of 
reasonableness, fairness and justice.10Human dignity, Equality and Freedom are the founding 
values of our Constitution and are all connected to labour rights.  
The constitution also strictly forbids any form of discrimination. Section 9 of the 
Constitution11states; 
“(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
 
6 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 7 BCLR 687 (CC) par 74. 
7 Kentridge “Introducing the right to equality in the interim Constitution” 1994 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 149 150. 
8 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
9 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) par 28. 
10 Cornell (n 4) 73. 
11 This section is generally accepted as the equality clause. 
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(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement 
of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms of subsection  
(3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that 
the discrimination is fair.”12 
The section promotes equal treatment of all people including people in employment relationships 
and prohibits discrimination based on specific and other grounds. It also instructs parliament to 
enact legislation that will ensure such prohibition. Although there are various pieces of labour 
legislation dealing with different labour matters including the Labour Relations Act (LRA)13 which 
is the primary source, the Employment Equity Act (EEA)14 specifically regulates the issue of 
discrimination in the workplace. The Act also applies to job-seeking applicants and purports to 
achieve equity in the workplace through eliminating discrimination and promoting equal 
opportunity and fair treatment in the workplace.15Although the Act affords this anti-discrimination 
protection to employees, it also gives the employers certain defences and justifications where a 
claim of unfair discrimination arises against them.  
An employer can utilize the defence of an inherent job requirement in the case of an unfair 
discrimination claim both in terms of the LRA and the EEA. However, the inherent job 
requirement is not defined in the Acts and defence is narrow in that it only looks at the essential 
 
12 s 9(1)-(5) of the Constitution. 
13 66 of 1995. 
14 55 of 1998. 
15 s 2 of the Employment Equity Act. 
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duties of a particular job. Additionally, there is barely sufficient case law where this defence has 
been used.  
 
1.3 Research aims and synopsis 
The objective of this minor dissertation is to evaluate and consider the insufficiencies of the 
statutory provisions dealing with the inherent job requirement as a defence in unfair discrimination 
claims by employees or job seeking applicants in South Africa. The dissertation will seek to 
analyse how the courts deal with cases where the inherent job requirement defense is used as well 
as examine if there is a general test found in legislation or coined by the courts to determine the 
basis and extent of the defence. In the absence of such a test, this dissertation will seek to fashion 
one. This dissertation will also consider inputs from the International Labour Organisation (ILO)16 
as well as look at the regulations with regards to a similar defence in Australia.  
This minor dissertation aims to achieve the following research outcomes: 
1. To provide an overview and understanding of the regulatory provisions relevant to 
discrimination in the workplace and instances where such discrimination is unfair as well 
as examine the defences (particularly the inherent job requirement defence) available to an 
employer where unfair discrimination is alleged. 
2. to evaluate and analyse different South African cases where the courts dealt with the 
inherent job requirement defence. 
3. to establish a test for determining what constitutes an inherent job requirement and in what 
instance it can be used 
4. to look for lessons from international and foreign law through a comparative study. 
1.4 Research methodology 
This dissertation will be based on a doctrinal analysis comprising of analysis of legislation, case 
law and secondary sources of law. It will also comprise of comparative research. 
 
16 South Africa is a member state and has ratified all its core conventions. 
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1.5 Limitations of research 
For purposes of this minor dissertations, the research will be limited to only the inherent job 
requirement as a defence against unfair discrimination and will not focus on affirmative action as 
a defence. Only three South African cases will be studied in depth in this regard due to space 
constraints. The comparative chapter will briefly look at ILO provisions and will only focus on 
Australian foreign law, to the exclusion of any legal provisions found in the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America, Canada and any other foreign jurisdiction. 
 
1.6 Chapter outlines 
Chapter 1 sets the background to the research of this minor dissertation. It provides a research 
question in which it will attempt to answer. The chapter also sets out the problem statement and 
outlines the aims and synopsis of the research topic. Lastly, the chapter deals with the research 
methodology adopted as well as the limitations of the study. 
Chapter 2 deals with the legal framework relating to the topic of the minor dissertation by looking 
at the relevant constitutional and legislative provisions in South Africa. The chapter is intended to 
scrutinize the labour law framework in the South African context by focusing on two key Acts as 
well as examine the scope of the inherent job requirements within employment relations. This 
chapter will look at discrimination both within a general lens and within the labour law context. 
Chapter 3 contains an analysis of case law dealing with the inherent job requirements in 
discrimination cases in South Africa. This chapter looks at how the courts interpret and deal with 
such cases and the test adopted by the courts in this regard.            
Chapter 4 comprises of a comparative study and will look at the ILO provisions relating to the 
research topic. The study will look at the constitutional obligations where international and 
foreignlaw is concerned. Furthermore, the chapter will look at the regulations in Australia with 
special emphasis on the Australian case law dealing with the inherent job requirements as a defence 
against a claim for unfair discrimination.    
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Chapter 5 contains the conclusion and recommendations of the dissertation by proposing a test to 
be adopted in unfair discrimination cases in the workplace as well as calls for the amendment of 
certain provisions in the labour legislation. 
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Chapter 2 
The South African labour relations is grounded in complex history that must be evaluated from a 
political and socio-economic spectrum. As it stands, the nature and extent of the regulation of the 
labour market and work in general remains an issue of political contention.17 The characteristics 
of inequality in the country continue to be replicated in the labour market.18This chapter however, 
will not look deeply into such history nor will it provide a critical analysis of the historical 
milestones in labour law. This chapter will provide an outline of legislation, specifically the EEA 
and the LRA. It will also outline the constitutional framework relating to discrimination, 
particularly in the workplace as well discuss the concept of equality within the South African legal 
framework. 
 
2.1 The Constitutional framework 
2.1.1 The interim Constitution 
The concept of equality has been a central focus of South African law since the advent of the 
interim Constitution.19Section 8 of the interim Constitution20enshrined an equality provision that 
specifically prohibited unfair discrimination on certain grounds.21 It also contained a promise that 
the law would not only safeguard the people of South Africa, but that it would benefit them equally. 
Much like the current Constitution, the interim Constitution prohibited unfair discrimination, 
whether direct or indirect on any person based on one or a combination of grounds such as race, 
gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture or language.22 
 
17 Christianson, McGregor and van Eck Law@Work (4th ed) 3. 
18 Based on the ILO’s 1992 country review conducted. 
19 Thompson, Benjamin, Duppers and Garbers South African Labour Law (1965) 9. 
20 The Constitution of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
21 s 8(2) of the interim Constitution. 
22 These are similar grounds to those found in s 9(3) of the 1996 Constitution. See also n 6 above. 
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It is against this background that the Industrial Court dealt with numerous cases of discrimination 
claims. The court in this regard would often find it difficult to tackle the claims of discrimination 
and in the context of employment and therefore opted to render the claims as unfair labour 
practices. In Association of Professional Teachers and Another v Minister of Education23the 
Industrial Court found that a policy in which the Public Service Code provided that subsidized 
housing could only be granted to legally married women in the case where the husband was 
medically unwell to be in a paid employment relationship amounted to direct discrimination 
against a class of women. This was discrimination based on sex and marital status, however, the 
court upheld that although there was existence of discrimination, it only amounted to unfair labour 
practices. Although the Industrial Court’s powers were limited in that it could not hear 
constitutional matters, it nevertheless paid attention to s 35(3) of the interim Constitution which 
required courts to have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the chapter on fundamental 
rights when interpreting, developing and applying the law.24 
 
2.1.2 The 1996 Constitution 
Since 1993/4 South Africa has been characterized by comprehensive political, constitutional and 
socio-economic transformation and change.25 The constitutional dispensation is premised on 
principles such as freedom of speech and association, freedom to assemble and respect for life and 
property, as well as maintaining civilized standards and discipline.26 The 1996 Constitution was 
adopted in May 1996 and came into effect in February 1997 as the successor of the interim 
Constitution. In terms of its preamble, this Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic27 and 
 
23 1995 16 ILJ 1048 (IC). See also George v Western Cape Education Department 1995 16 ILJ 1529 (IC). 
24 Dupper (n 2) 12. 
25 Le Roux “Public policy-making and policy analysis in South Africa amidst transformation, change and 
globalisation: Views on participants and role players in the policy analytic procedure” 2002 Journal of Public 
Administration 418. 
26 n 13 above. 
27 See also s 2 of the Constitution which states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and any law 
or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. 
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it purports to improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person. In 
recognizing constitutional supremacy, the court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
SA; In Re: Ex Parte Application of the President of the RSA28 recognized that there are no two 
systems of law each dealing with its own issue, but that there is only one system of law shaped by 
the Constitution as the supreme law. In this regard, the court held that all law, including common 
was under constitutional control. The Constitution also recognizes key values in section 1 in terms 
of which the country as a sovereign and democratic state is founded upon.  The core values include 
human dignity, equality and freedom. In s 1(b), non-racialism and non-sexism are recognized as 
founding values of the Constitution. This section immediately outlines the idea of anti-
discrimination that is promoted by the Constitution in section 9.  
Our Constitution values equality both as a right and a founding principle of our Constitutional 
democracy. Section 9 of the Constitution promotes the notion of equality and prohibits 
discrimination based on listed and unlisted grounds however, the provision also places a positive 
duty on the state to act in order to ensure that everyone enjoys these rights and freedoms. This 
provision in the Constitution is important in the discussion of inherent job requirements in the 
workplace because some of these requirements can amount to discrimination. However, this will 
be explored later in the paper.  
The concept of equality needs to be investigated further. It is important to consider whether, to 
support our constitutional democratic vision, we need to follow a formalistic or substantive 
approach to the concept of equality. Formal equality requires that persons who are in the same 
position should be treated the same and that people should not be treated different because of their 
religion, race or gender.29 It therefore presupposes that all people are equal bearers of rights. In 
this regard, inequality is an irregularity that can be eliminated by extending the same rights and 
entitlements to all persons according to the same neutral standard of measurement.30Substantive 
equality on the other hand, ensures that laws and policies do not reinforce the subordination of 
people or groups of people already subjected to political, social or economic disadvantage by 
 
28 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) par 44. 
29 Smith “Equality constitutional adjudication in South Africa” 2014 African Human Rights Law Journal 609 611. 
30 De Waal, Curries and Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (2000).  
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requiring law to treat people as substantive equals and accommodating their 
differences.31Substantive equality considers remedial and restitutionary elements.32It is therefore 
not blind to the social and economic differences between people.  
Arguably, s 9(2) of the Constitution indicates that substantive equality is envisaged by the 
Constitution. Firstly, it declares that equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms and secondly, it clarifies that affirmative action is not considered as an exception to a 
formal idea of equality.33 Formal equality as we understand it, does not take into account the socio-
economic differences between people while substantive equality focuses on the effects of a 
particular rule as opposed to the form it assumes. President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Hugo34 recognized that treating people identically, and thereby following a formal equality notion 
can often result in inequality. In this regard, the court stated that although the long-term goal of 
our constitution is to achieve equal treatment of people, insisting on equal treatment where 
inequality has been established may result in the entrenchment of that inequality. 
The Constitution seeks to promote the advancement of human rights and freedoms and this 
includes labour rights. In terms of s 13 of the Constitution, no one may be subjected to slavery, 
servitude and forced labour. This section gives the idea that labour rights are fundamental human 
rights and that there exists a strong link between labour rights and human dignity. There are other 
sections in the Constitution that are related to labour rights including s 17 which states that 
everyone has the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present petitions in a peaceful and 
unarmed manner. This section in the labour context has allowed employees to act where they have 
grievances by following the relevant guidelines. Section 18 grants everyone the right to freedom 
of association, which includes the right to join trade unions and engage in collective bargaining 
where labour matters are concerned. Section 22 further states that every citizen has the right to 
choose their trade, occupation or profession freely and that such trade, profession or practice may 
 
31  Le Roux (n 26) 420. 
32 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) par 60. 
33 Dupper et al (n 2 above). 
34 1997 4 SA 1 (CC). 
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be regulated by law. All these provisions are relevant in informing labour relations in the South 
African context.  
One of the most relevant provisions relating to labour rights is s 23 of the Constitution. Section 
23(1) states that veryone has the right to fair labour practices. The section prohibits unfair labour 
practices and gives birth to labour legislation such as the Labour Relations Act, The Employment 
Equity Act, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and other relevant pieces of legislation, 
including those touching on labour and social security which have shaped the South African labour 
relations. This section provides a broader protection of labour rights than that found in legislation 
which tends to be narrow and specific to employees. The use of the word “everyone” for example, 
tells us that the section intended to provide protection to people in a work relationship that is akin 
to an employment relationship. Furthermore, the protection provided under the section is not 
limited to individuals but is wide enough to include collective relationships. Section 23(1) also 
dives into concept of unfairness within the scope of labour law. The section prohibits unfair labour 
practices while at the same time, although not expressly, promotes the principle of fairness. We 
know from our labour legislation that the concept of fairness plays a massive role in the protection 
of labour rights. For example, the LRA prohibits unfair dismissals while the EEA prohibits unfair 
discrimination.  
 
2.2 The legislative framework 
It is a basic tenet and rule of our law that we cannot bypass national legislation and rely directly 
on the Constitution in reaching a legal decision.35This is known as the principle of subsidiarity. In 
NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape,36 the Constitutional Court confirmed this 
principle and held that where legislation is enacted to give effect to a right, a litigant may not 
bypass such legislation. Within the labour law framework, this principle would require us to refer 
 
35 Henrico “Subverting PAJA in judicial review: the cause of much uncertainty in South African administrative law” 
2018 Journal of South Africa 288 289. 
36 2001 2 SA 112 (C); See also Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as Amici 
Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC). 
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to the LRA in enforcing the rights under s 23 of the Constitution. Similarly, we would look at the 
EEA to enforce s 9 rights under the Constitution. In South African National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defense 37 the court held that where legislation had been enacted to give effect to a 
constitutional right, that legislation must form the basis for any action to claim protection in terms 
of that right. However, where there is no remedy in terms of the legislation, the Constitution is 
always a point of reference. In this instance, a constitutional right can be directly relied upon in a 
situation where it is simultaneously alleged to be inadequate to protect that right. This means that 
where a person wants to raise a claim based on the rights under s 23 of the Constitution, they must 
look at the LRA and the EEA for remedies unless the constitutionality of the legislation is in 
question or being challenged.38 
 
2.2.1 The Labour Relations Act  
At the time when the previous 1956 LRA was operative, employers had the right not to appoint a 
person on the basis of, for example, their race, gender or their trade membership.39 Additionally, 
job seeking applicants had no remedies in cases where they had been unfairly discriminated. This 
position, however, has since changed in new legislation.  Some legislative provisions also 
promoted unfair discrimination, for example, the Industrial Conciliation Act40 provided for a 
system of job reservation where the state had the power to reserve certain jobs for white employees. 
There existed no legislation that prohibited discrimination of racial or sexual form in the 
workplace. After the 1973 Durban strikes and the 1976 Soweto uprising, the government set up 
the Wiehahn Commission to look at industrial relations in the country.41After two years, the 
commission made recommendations that the Labour Relations Act be amended in respect to 
granting of Black trade unions legal recognition.  
 
37 2007 28 ILJ 1909 (CC) par 51. 
38 Grogan Employment Rights (2010) 5. 
39 Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
40 28 of 1956. 
41 http:www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/wiehahn-commision-report-tabled-parliament (14-10-2019). 
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In 1993, at the advent of the Constitutional dispensation, equality became a central focus in the 
law. Even with this, labour legislation still did not contain specific provisions that prohibited 
discrimination. In 1994, when the newly democratically elected Minister of labour was appointed, 
the minister put forward a five-year programme of Action to restructure the country’s labour 
department. The 1995 Labour Relations Act became the center of this five-year plan to reform 
South Africa’s labour legislation. Other legislation followed the enactment of the 1995 LRA, these 
include the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 42in 1997 and the Employment Equity 
Act (EEA)43 in 1998. 
The new LRA which came into operation on 11 November 1996 contains provisions that 
specifically prohibit the discrimination of employees and job applicants.44 Although not mentioned 
in s 1 as an express purpose of the Act, the prohibition of discrimination is found as a general 
theme in the Act and in specific dismissal provisions. Section 187 of the LRA reads as follows: 
“(1)  A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, acts contrary to 
section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is – 
(e) the employee’s pregnancy, intended pregnancy, or any reason related to her pregnancy; 
(f)  that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on any 
arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, 
culture, language, marital status or family responsibility; 
(2) Despite subsection (1)(f)- 
(a)  a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on an inherent job 
requirement of the particular job; 
(b) a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement 
age for persons employed in that capacity.” 
Section 187(2) of the LRA provides the employer with a justification for dismissal based on the 
inherent job requirement with reference to s 187(1)(f) only. A claim for automatically unfair 
 
42 75 of 1997. 
43 n 14 above. 
44  Dupper (n 2) 21. 
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dismissals based on pregnancy may be brought in terms of s 187(1)(e) which specifically deals 
with pregnancy or may be brought in terms of s 187(1)(f) as an unlisted ground of discrimination. 
In the case where the claim is brought on the latter, the employer would have the opportunity to 
use the defence of the inherent requirement of the job in terms of s 187 (2) (a). However, if the 
claim is based on pregnancy in terms of s 187(1)(e), then the employer would have to prove that 
it was fair and dispense with such onus in terms of s 192(2) of the LRA. 
 
2.2.2 The Employment Equity Act 
The preamble of the EEA recognizes that apartheid and other discriminatory laws have caused 
disparities in labour relations and that as a result, groups of disadvantaged people have emerged, 
and drastic changes have to be made to redress the inequalities that now exist. In this regard, the 
Act seeks to promote the constitutional right to equality, eliminate unfair discrimination in 
employment, promote diversity in the workplace and promote economic development and 
efficiency in the workplace.45It is important to note that in terms of s 9 of the Act, employee also 
refers to an applicant for employment and that the requirements and protections afforded to 
employees for purposes of s 6, 7 and 8 apply to job applicants. Section 5 of the Act urges employers 
to take steps to promote equal opportunity and to eliminate unfair discrimination in the workplace. 
The section places a duty on the employer to ensure that the workplace promotes the values of the 
Constitution and is in line with the Act. It is clear that to eliminate discrimination, values of the 
Constitution such as equality have to play a role. With regards to the issue of unfair discrimination 
in the workplace with reference to the South African labour market, no enquiry is complete without 
looking at s 6(1) and (2) of the EEA which states; 
“ (1)  No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any employment 
policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV 
status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, birth or on any other arbitrary ground. 
(2) It is not unfair discrimination to-  
 
45 Preamble of the Employment Equity Act. 
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 (a)  take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or 
 (b)  distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent        requirement of a 
job.” 
Section 6 (1) of the EEA is similar to s 187(1)(f) of the LRA in that they both prohibit unfair 
treatment of employees based on discriminatory grounds. S 6 (1) of the EEA, however, is much 
wider that s 187(1)(f) of the LRA. In the EEA, pregnancy for example is a listed ground of 
discrimination in which the employer can use the inherent job requirement to justify its fairness. 
The EEA also lists more grounds of discrimination than both the Constitution and the LRA. In 
terms of the EEA, it is also unfair to discriminate an employee based on their HIV status as a listed 
ground. In the LRA, a dismissal based on ones HIV status would be rendered automatically unfair 
based on an arbitrary ground.46 While the LRA provided for the inherent requirements of the job 
and the retirement age as justifications for automatically unfair dismissals, the EEA provides that 
only affirmative action measures and the inherent job requirements may be raised as defences to 
justify unfair discrimination in the workplace.  
Affirmative action measures are defined as measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified 
people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented 
in all occupation categories in the workplace of the designated employer.47 It is clear that based on 
this definition, an employer can use the defence of affirmative action measures to justify an unfair 
discrimination claim by alleging that the said employee is not suitably qualified for that particular 
position. This would mean that the job applicant or employee lacks the academic qualifications, 
skills or experience required for the performance of that job and that another employee or applicant 
from a different racial group is better qualified or “suitably qualified” to fill in the position. It is to 
be noted however that affirmative action does not always apply as a ground of justification. The 
court in Robinson v Price Waterhouse Coopers48 stated that affirmative action can never be used 
as a legitimate ground for retrenchment. Based on this, it is evident that there exists a limitation 
on the instances where the justification can be used. 
 
46 Allpass v Mooikloof Estate (PTY) Ltd 2011 ZALCJHB par 121. 
47 s 15(1) of Act 55 of 1998; See also Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013.     
48 2006 5 BLLR 504 (LC) par 22; See also Thekiso v IBM South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2007 3 BLLR 253 (LC) par 49. 
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2.3 The meaning of inherent job requirement 
The EEA does not provide for a definition of inherent requirements of the job. The term ‘inherent 
job requirements’ originates from the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 
of the ILO.49The committee of experts in the ILO have emphasized that there must be strict 
interpretation of this defence. Any defence in legislation that seeks to justify discrimination also 
limits the right to equality entrenched in the Constitution and therefore should be applied 
restrictively.50The Industrial Court in Association of Professional Teacher  v Minister of Education 
51 emphasized that this defence should be allowed only in very limited circumstances. 
The revised draft code of good practice on the employment of persons with disabilities published 
in the Government Gazette52 defines the inherent requirements of the job as those requirements 
the employer stipulates as necessary for a person to be appointed to the job. It relates to attributes 
which must relate in an inescapable way to the performance of the job.53 These are necessary 
requirements necessary in order to enable an employee to perform the essential functions of that 
job.54 It is clear based on this definition, that the discretion to determine what constitutes the 
inherent job requirements lies with the employer. The code, although not legally binding, and 
merely a guideline, empowers the employer to establish, based on the needs of the occupation, 
what qualifications, experience and skills are required. The same notion is expressed in the Public 
Service Regulations55which requires the executing authority to establish a job description, title and 
inherent job requirements for every post put out. 
To better understand what constitutes an inherent job requirement, we must go into an enquiry of 
what the term itself entails. The term ‘inherent’ has been defined as a permanent tribute or quality; 
 
49 No 111 of 1958. 
50 Dupper and Garbers Employment Discrimination: A Commentary in Thompson and Benjamin, South African Labour 
Law (2004). 
51 n 22 above. 
52 GG 38872 (12-06-2015). 
53 Cooper “The boundaries of equality in labour law” 2004 ILJ 813.       
54 Item 7.3.2 of the Revised Draft Code of Good Practice on the employment of persons with disabilities.   
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forming an element, especially and essential element of something.56A ‘job’ is defined as the basic 
duties, tasks, functions, competency requirements and responsibilities to which posts of the same 
grade are established.57 Furthermore, the Public Service Regulations define inherent requirements 
of a job as competencies that, according to evidence, an employee needs to perform that job.58This 
evidence refers to competency certificates and documentation supporting qualifications, training, 
experience or skills. The inherent requirements of the job are not universal requirements but are 
those specific to a job and that an employer deems necessary for the performance of the job. A 
dismissal or discrimination of an employee or job applicant based on these requirements is clearly 
based on not being up to the standard that the employer requires for that job. Elements of unfairness 
may be present in such circumstances and the defence is an absolute defence against unfairness.59 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The concept of fairness is rooted in our Constitution and is coherent with the notion of equality 
that is core and foundational to our democracy. The Constitution seeks to protect the rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights and advance human rights. Labour rights are enshrined in the 
Constitution and are important for the economic development of the country. South Africa, by 
comparison is still a young democratic country plagued with various political, social and economic 
challenges including challenges relating to the labour market. The right to fair labour practices as 
expressed in s 23 suggests that people who are engaged in employment relationships must be 
treated fairly. This means that they may not be unfairly discriminated against based on various 
factors already listed. However, national labour legislation provides that where unfair 
discrimination is raised by an employee, an employer can justify their conduct by raising certain 
defences in terms of s 187(1)(f) of the LRA and in terms of s 6(2) of the EEA. These defence are 
not absolute as expressed by the ILO and the Courts in certain instances. One of the defences 
 
56 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (4th ed) 569. 
57 n 59 below. 
58 n 48 above. 
59 Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd 1997 11 BLLR 1438 (LC) 148H. 
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available in both the LRA and the EEA is the defence of the inherent job requirements which must 
be interpreted strictly as well.  
This chapter has evaluated the concept of equality in terms of both the interim and the current 
constitution and what discrimination entails in this regard. The Constitution also codifies certain 
rights in relation to labour law that we looked at, including s 23 which gave birth to our current 
labour legislation. Two key pieces of legislation were relevant for this chapter, the LRA and the 
EEA, especially where dealing with discrimination the workplace and the grounds of justification 
available.  
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Chapter 3 
Judicial intervention 
3.1 Interpretation by the Courts 
Since the inherent requirements of the job defence first made it into our labour legislation, our 
courts have battled with coming up with a definitive approach where claims of unfairness, with 
regards to dismissal and discrimination in the workplace arise. It is still unclear, what constitutes 
an inherent requirement of a job and the instances where such a defence can be raised. There have 
been several opportunities, however, where the courts have been able to interpret the meaning and 
scope of the defence. This chapter will look at three specific cases where the defence had been 
used and evaluate how the courts approach it. It will also look at some general tests in this regard. 
 
3.1.1 Department of Correctional Services v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union60 
The respondents in this matter were former male correctional officers who held various positions 
at Pollsmoor Correctional Facility Prison in Cape Town. The appellant was the Department of 
Correctional Services, Western Cape. The department had dismissed the respondents in the year 
2007 for non-compliance with the department’s Dress Code as it related to male hairstyles. All the 
respondents had grown dreadlocks for various reasons including, religious and cultural reasons. 
Their dismissal came after they refused to cut their dreadlocks when they were ordered to do so. 
The respondents then referred the matter to the Labour Court after an attempt for an internal appeal 
failed.61  
At the Labour Court, the respondent’s primary claim was for the court to declare that their 
dismissals were automatically unfair in terms of s 187(1)(f) of the LRA and that the department 
had unfairly discriminated against them directly or indirectly on the basis of religion, conscience, 
belief, culture and gender as envisaged by the legislative provision. Other alternative claims sought 
by the respondents included a claim for damages, compensation and reinstatement. With regards 
 
60 2013 7 BLLR 639 (SCA). 
61  the Leonard Dingler (LC) case (n 59) par 9. 
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to the primary claim, the LC accepted that indeed the respondents were dismissed because of their 
dreadlocks and their non-compliance with the instruction of the respondent to cut the dreadlocks. 
It found that indeed there were cultural and religious reasons for wearing the dreadlocks and that 
only male officers were subjected to the ‘no dreadlocks’ rule. The court, however found that the 
respondents had failed to communicate their beliefs, cultural and religious reasons to the 
Commissioner who had issued their suspension, and thus had failed to establish a causal link 
between the prohibited reasons for the dismissal and the circumstances of the dismissal.  In this 
regard, the court found that there was no discrimination, whether direct or indirect on the 
respondents based on belief, culture or religion. The court held that there was, however, 
discrimination based on gender because the rules on dreadlocks only applied to male officers. 
Consequently, the court held that the appellants had failed to rebut unfairness and could not prove 
that the dismissals were automatically unfair. 
The matter then went on appeal at the Labour Appeal Court (LAC). The LAC dismissed the appeal 
and held that the dismissals were automatically unfair based on religion, culture or belief.  
Upon further appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), the appellants argued that the 
discrimination was justifiable since its purpose was to eliminate the risk posed by placing officers 
who belong to a religion that promotes criminality; that is the use of dagga, especially in a high 
risk area like a prison. They argued that dreadlocked or Rastafari officials had a higher risk of 
being manipulated into illegally bringing dagga into prisons. Regarding the issue of gender 
discrimination, the appellants held that they were not too concerned about female officials because 
they were used to wearing long hair and that as concurred in Prince v President, Cape Town Law 
Society62that women and children are not involved in the Rastafarian use of dagga.63 
On the matter of discrimination, the court held that the general rule is that once discrimination has 
been established on a listed ground,  unfairness is then presumed, and the onus then lies on the 
employer to prove the contrary as per the test in Harksen v Lane.64Other relevant considerations 
in this regard include the position of the victim of the discrimination in society, the extent to which 
 
62 2002 2 SA 794 (CC). 
63 the Leonard Dingler (LC) case (n 59) par 20. 
64 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) par 48. 
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the interests and rights of the discrimination victim have been affected, evaluating whether the 
discrimination has impaired the dignity of the victim65 and if there are less restrictive means of 
achieving the purpose of the discrimination.66 
The SCA applied this test and found that there was not rational connection between the purpose 
of the discrimination and the measure taken and, in this regard, the department had failed to prove 
that it would suffer an unreasonable burden if the respondents were to be exempted. It held that 
the appeal must therefore fail. 
 
3.1.2 IMATU v City of Cape Town67 
The applicant in this matter is the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) 
representing Mr. Murdoch (second applicant), who at the time of the application was employed by 
the respondent (City of Cape Town). The second applicant was employed as a law enforcement 
officer by the respondent under the Protection Services Directorate. Later Murdoch requested for 
an internal transfer from law enforcement to become firefighter under the City. This request was 
not granted since he had type 1 diabetes and was insulin dependent. IMATU then alleged that the 
respondent was directly discriminating against Murdoch on the grounds of disability, alternatively, 
on arbitrary grounds or an analogous unlisted ground being his medical condition.  
The respondent argued that there was a blanket ban that prohibited the appointment of applicants 
in similar positions as Murdoch and that this ban was fair and justifiable based on the inherent job 
requirements as envisaged in s 6(2) of the EEA. The respondent based its argument further on an 
assessment that was done by an internal occupational health medical practitioner on Murdoch 
which concluded that if he were to be appointed as a firefighter, he would pose an unacceptable 
risk to himself, other employees and the public in general. The practitioner recommended that due 
to the occupational requirements of the firefighting job, the insulin dependency rendered him 
medically unsuitable to perform the job.  
 
65 n 60 above par 51. 
66 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) par 31. 
67 2005 11 BLLR 1084 (LC). 
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The Labour Court in dealing with this matter looked at the concept of discrimination under the 
auspices of section 6 of the EEA. It accepted that the Act prohibited direct and indirect 
discrimination of employees on listed and unlisted grounds. Furthermore, the court acknowledged 
that where unfair discrimination is alleged in terms of the section, an employer could raise the 
inherent requirements of the job as a defence in terms of s 6(2). The onus would rest on the 
employer as per s 11 of the EEA, which requires that where unfair discrimination is alleged, the 
employer against whom it is alleged must prove that it is fair. In Hofman v South African Airways,68 
it was held that the effect of s 11 is that it creates a rebuttable presumption that once the applicant 
shows the existence of discrimination, it is assumed to be unfair and the onus then rests on the 
employer to prove its fairness.69 
The court then accepted that in this case, the approach with regards to unfair discrimination 
employed in the Harksen v Lane70case should be applied. The first enquiry in terms of this 
approach is whether the provision differentiates between people or a category of people. If it does, 
is there a rational connection between the differentiation and the legitimate purpose it was designed 
to achieve. If it doesn’t, then there is a violation of the guarantee to equality. The second enquiry 
asks whether the differentiation amounts to unfair discrimination. To establish this, there is a 
further two-step approach. The first asks whether the differentiation amounts to discrimination; if 
it is on a listed ground, then discrimination is established. If it is based on an unspecified ground, 
then the existence of discrimination would have to be based on an objective test looking at whether 
it is based on attributes that had the potential to impair the dignity of the person or group or it could 
adversely affect them in a comparable manner. Secondly, if the differentiation amounted to 
discrimination, was the discrimination unfair? If on specified grounds, then unfairness is 
presumed.71 
The respondent had admitted that it differentiated between Murdoch and other persons in an 
employment practice or policy based on the fact that he was diabetic and insulin dependent as a 
 
68 2000 2 SA 628 (W).  
69 See also Jooste v Score Supermaket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour Intervening) 1992 2 SA 1 (CC). 
70 n 62 above. 
71 the Christian Education (CC) case (n 66) par 81. 
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result. However, the respondent argued that the differentiation did not amount to unfair 
discrimination because there was a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose. It 
averred that as a government authority, there was a duty to provide fire protection services through 
fire fighters in terms of the Constitution72 and the Fire Brigade Services Act.73 There was also an 
additional duty in terms of the Occupational Health and Safety Act74 to provide a safe working 
environment for its employees as far as is reasonably practical. It therefore could not take a chance 
on the applicant as this would pose risk not only to the applicant but possibly to other employees 
and members of the public. Additionally, the respondent wanted to avoid any claim for 
compensation in cases of injuries under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act.75The court held in this regard that the differentiation can be seen as a legitimate way of 
ensuring public safety and that there was a rational cause to such objective.76 
On the second enquiry, the court had to decide whether the differentiation had been on a specified 
ground in terms of s 6(1) of the EEA being “disability” or whether it was based on an analogous 
ground such as the applicant’s medical condition. The court held that our law did not regard an 
insulin dependent person as disabled or as having a disability, although it amounted to a certain 
physical impairment and therefore there was insufficient evidence to prove that the differentiation 
was on a specified ground. This meant that the applicants needed to show that there was existence 
of discrimination on an analogous ground based on attributes and/or characteristics having the 
potential to impair Murdoch’s dignity or to adversely affect him in a comparably serious manner 
that amounts to discrimination.  The court was satisfied that Murdoch’s condition, type 1 diabetes, 
was an analogous ground of disability, HIV status, and possibly birth. It impaired his dignity by 
limiting his capacity to function to the full enjoyment of his rights under s 22 of the Constitution. 
77 Considering all these factors, the court held that the blanket ban which prevented the applicant 
 
72 s 155(6)(a) and (7) of the Constitution. 
73 99 of 1987. 
74 85 of 1995. 
75 130 of 1993. 
76 the IMATU (LC) case (n 67) par 87. 
77 the IMATU (LC) case (n 67) par 90. 
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from successfully transferring to the fire protection services directorate amounted to unfair 
discrimination.78 
The court accepted that unfair discrimination is justifiable in our law through mainly s 36 of the 
Constitution, however, the section was not applicable in this case. The relevant defence could be 
found in s 6(2) of the EEA, the defence of inherent job requirement. In this regard, the court found 
that the respondent had failed to justify the discrimination. The respondent had based the blanket 
ban on a general assessment as opposed to an individual assessment of the applicant’s 
circumstances. Murdoch had his condition under control and could perform the duties required. 
The court ordered that the employment policy of refusing to employ insulin dependent individuals 
as firefighters amounted to unfair discrimination and that going forward, each applicant must be 
assessed based on their own merits. 
 
3.1.3 Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd79 
The applicant in this matter had been offered a position by Woolworths (the respondent) as a 
Human Resources Generalist. She accepted the offer but before the agreement could be concluded, 
the responded repudiated the employment contract by effecting a dismissal. The applicant alleged 
that the dismissal was unfair as she was unfairly discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy 
and that in the circumstances, this amounted to unfair labour practices. The applicant argued that 
the dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of s 187(1)(e) of the LRA which prohibits the 
dismissal of an employee based on pregnancy, intended pregnancy or pregnancy related reasons. 
It was therefore important in this matter to determine whether the applicant was indeed an 
‘employee’. It was not enough that the applicant had concluded a contract of employment because 
that may give rise to a contractual claim but does not confer the status of employer and employee. 
To determine the scope of the employee status, the court looked at the definition of employee in 
terms of s 213 of the LRA. According to the section, the status of employee is conferred to a person 
who actually works for another person. The person must have rendered services, excluding those 
 
78 n 67 above par 91. 
79 1999 20 ILJ 2133 (LC). 
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of an independent contractor. Additionally, the person must have received remuneration for the 
services rendered. The court found the definition in the Act to be unsatisfactory and noted that the 
Act should cover persons who had finalized employment contracts and afford them some form of 
protection. However, because the wording in the Act was clear, the court held that the applicant’s 
claim for unfair dismissal must fail.80 
Turning to the applicant’s alternative claim of unfair labour practices in terms of item 2(1)(a) read 
with 2(2)(a) of schedule 7 to the Act. Item 2(1)(a) prohibits direct or indirect discrimination on 
arbitrary and listed grounds and item 2(2)(a) definition of an employee includes applicants for 
employment. Pregnancy is not a listed arbitrary ground in terms of the item, however the grounds 
listed are not exhaustive and discrimination can be based on other unlisted grounds. The 
respondent did not dispute the existence of discrimination based on an unlisted arbitrary ground 
but argued that the discrimination was not unfair because it was based on a requirement of 
uninterrupted job continuity (for 12 months) which applied equally to any applicant. According to 
the respondent, this requirement was rationally and commercially justifiable.81In this regard, the 
court could not find any reason why the requirement for uninterrupted continuity was necessary 
for the position. This requirement was unguaranteeable as it was possible that any employee could 
have challenges in course of the 12 months that could require them to discontinue their 
employment duties. This requirement was not objectively justifiable according to the court and the 
respondent was found to have committed an unfair labour practice and ordered to pay 
compensation to the applicant.82 
The matter went on appeal at the LAC83where the decision of the court aquo was reversed. Zondo 
AJP in giving his judgment considered that the appellant had gone ahead to appoint someone else 
for the position, citing that he was better qualified, experienced and suited than the respondent. 
The respondent, in Zondo’s view could not show that if not for her pregnancy, she would have 
been appointed for the position despite there being a better candidate than her. Therefore, there 
 
80 the Woolworths (LC) case (n 79) par 16. 
81 the Woolworths (LC) case (n 79) par 21. 
82 the Woolworths (LC) case (n 79) par 55. 
83 Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 2000 6 BLLR 640 (LAC). 
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was no causal connection to her not being appointed and her pregnancy. Although her pregnancy 
was taken into consideration when determining whether she should be appointed, but the 
overriding factor was that there was a stronger candidate which eliminates any element of 
unfairness.  
Conradie JA disputed the validity of the continuity requirement. In his opinion, the appellant did 
not initially attach much value to the continuity requirement until it was revealed that the 
respondent was pregnant. The appellant therefore failed to show that the continuity requirement 
was operationally important, so much so that it would have been unreasonable to expect the 
appellant to employ the respondent.84 
Willis JA after evaluating both Conradie JA and Zondo AJP’s contributions to the judgment, 
agreed with the order made by Zondo. He reasoned that there must a exist a balancing of interests 
in society and in any conflict involving a clash between the notions of freedom and equality. On 
the one hand, there is an ideal to maximise economic rationality which benefits the economic 
growth and prosperity of society. On the other hand, there is an ideal to protect the disadvantaged, 
which includes pregnant women so that we may be closer to reaching the goal of equality between 
men and women. He expressed that in reaching a decision in this matter, the court would give an 
imperfect result. He concluded that ignoring the pregnancy of a prospective employee and not 
considering it as factor for employment purposes may seem fair to the employee but certainly not 
to the employer and its impact would be devastating to society. The court then upheld the appeal 
with costs, the order of the court aquo was set aside and substituted.85 
 
3.2 Case analysis 
It seems there is no standard test that the courts apply in dealing with unfair discrimination claims 
and where the inherent requirements of the job can be used as a ground of justification. Although 
there are similar methods and evaluations adopted by the courts in the different scenarios, each 
case is dealt with based on its own merits. What is unanimous in the cases is that the courts always 
 
84 the Woolworths (LAC) case (n 83) par 48. 
85 the Woolworths (LAC) case (n 83) par 151. 
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go into an enquiry to establish the existence of discrimination. Discrimination of an employee 
based on a listed ground in legislation is easier to deal with because the onus automatically shifts 
to the employer. The employer will have to prove that the discrimination is fair by relying on the 
defences available in legislation, including the defence of the inherent job requirement. In some 
instances, even before the determination of the existence and extent of discrimination, where it is 
in dispute, the courts will enquire whether the claimant is in fact an employee. The definition of 
employee in terms of s 213 of the LRA normally applies. Sometimes, where the definition falls 
short, the presumption of who is an employee in terms of s 200A may apply. 
Once it is determined that the person is an employee or has a claim as job applicant in terms of the 
EEA,  and discrimination is established on a listed ground, the employer must prove on a balance 
of probabilities, that such discrimination did not take place as alleged or it is rational and not unfair, 
or otherwise justifiable.86If the discrimination is based on an analogous ground, the burden of proof 
shifts to the complainant who must show on a balance of probabilities that the conduct complained 
of is not rational and that it amounts to discrimination which is unfair. This is similar to the 
approach in Harksen v Lane (discussed above) which the courts like to reference. Other factors 
which are not exhaustive that the court considers include, the position of the complainant in society 
and whether they have been disadvantaged in the past, nature of the discriminating provision and 
its purpose, extent of the discrimination on the complainant and whether the discrimination has 
led to an impairment of their fundamental dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably 
serious nature.87 
This is the commonly applied test in unfair discrimination claims. Courts rarely go into a deep 
enquiry into the defences that can be raised against the claim. In these cases, dealing with the 
defence of inherent job requirement, the courts were more concerned with the existence and non-
existence of the discrimination and the impact it may have than the defence raised. Once the court 
establishes that there is rationality and a legitimate purpose to the discrimination, which rationality 
sometimes has little to do with the defence in question, the court concludes the matter and makes 
 
86 s 11(1) of the EEA.  
87 Kruger “Equality and unfair discrimination: refining the Harksen v Lane test” 2011 The South African Law Journal 
479 482. 
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a finding. The courts seldom dwell into what constitutes an inherent job requirement and whether 
the requirement itself is a fair requirement. The notion of fairness is only relevant in so far as it 
speaks to the discrimination but not the defence.  
In my opinion, the courts should go beyond determining the fairness and unfairness of merely the 
discrimination, but more focus, where the defence of inherent job requirement is made, should be 
on the fairness of the defence itself. There must be an enquiry as to what actually constitutes an 
inherent job requirement by looking into the relevance and necessity of that requirement to that 
specific job. Granted, each job will have its own requirements but there must be a thorough enquiry 
into those requirements, we must ask whether in the absence of those requirements, there can be 
no performance of the job. And if there can be performance, would it yield similar results as those 
if the job requirements were met. For example, if it is an inherent job requirement that firefighters 
must not be diabetics who are insulin dependent, we must ask whether, in the case where this was 
not a requirement, would the complainant otherwise qualify as a firefighter? And if so, would they 
perform in a manner that provides similar results to other firefighters who are not diabetic and 
insulin dependent? If the answer is no, then the requirement can be accepted as fair.  
 
Conclusion  
There is still much work to be done to balance the interests of both employees and employers in 
the employment relationship. Unfortunately, the relationship is inherently unequal with the 
consequence that employees are the economically weaker parties. Labour legislation offers 
protection and governs this relationship but is it enough? Are employees shielded from unfair 
discrimination in the workplace and are the defences available to employees in this regard not 
further oppressing employees? Employers normally set the standards for employment for 
advertised positions, including the requirements of the job, is it fair that they can use the same 
requirements they engineered to justify a claim of unfair discrimination against them? How do we 
prevent the abuse of the defence by employers? 
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Chapter 4 
 An international perspective and lessons from foreign jurisdiction 
4.1 Introduction 
Our Constitution obliges us to consider international and foreign law when dealing with any 
matter. Section 232 of the Constitution states that customary international law is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution. In s 233, the Constitution obliges the courts 
to prefer any reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law. 
Furthermore, s 39 states that when interpreting the Bill of rights, a court, tribunal or forum must 
consider international law88 and may consider foreign law.89 This chapter is going to look at what 
are international obligations are with regards to discrimination in the workplace and what 
guidelines can be found in the International Labour Organisation in this regard. It will also look at 
foreign jurisdiction as per s 39(1)(c) by analyzing Australian case law dealing with discrimination 
claims in the workplace and the defences available to employers. A comparative perspective 
enables us to see through our systemic myths and forces us to face the realities of our own 
systems.90It is therefore necessary to look elsewhere for lessons to be learnt in this regard.91 
 
4.2 The International labour organization. 
The advent of the new political dispensation in 1994 heralded the coming of a new labour 
dispensation. Labour relations and labour policies changed significantly from those which 
prevailed under the previous government.92 A substantial portion of this transformation is linked 
to the consideration and application of international standards. Our Constitution is also pro-
international standards and insists that we consider international law when enforcing legal rules.  
 
88 s 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
89 s 39(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
90 Simitis “Denationalising labour law: the case of age discrimination” 1994 Comparative Labour LJ 321.  
91 Naidu “The inherent job requirement’ defence- lessons from abroad” 1998 SA Merc LJ 173 174. 
92 Kruger and Tshoose “The impact of the Labour Relations Act on minority trade unions: A South African 
perspective” 2013 PELJ 285 285. 
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The LRA also recognises the significance of International law and states that it is to be interpreted 
in compliance with the public international law obligations of the country.93 One of the main 
purposes of the LRA94 is to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state 
of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The ILO is a specialised agency of the United 
Nations (UN) which is (amongst other related matters) responsible for developing international 
labour framework and policies.  
 
4.2.1 Understanding the International Labour Organisation and its relationship with South Africa 
In the 1980s, international labour standards informally influenced the Industrial Courts 
jurisprudence on unfair labour practices.95 This means that the development of pre-constitutional 
South African labour laws were indirectly influenced by international standards. In today’s 
constitutional dispensation, it is impossible to understand labour law without applying one’s mind 
to international standards and the institutions that shape it.96The relevant institution in this regard 
is the ILO. The ILO was founded in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles97 to demonstrate that world 
peace can be achievable through social justice. In 1946, the ILO became the first League of 
Nations’ (now the UN) specialised agency. South Africa was (then Union of South Africa) a 
signatory of the Treaty of Versailles and a member state of the UN. As a member of the UN, South 
Africa automatically extended its membership to the ILO. 
The aim of the ILO was to establish an institution through which international standards 
(conventions and recommendations) could be adopted to promote conditions that would enable the 
well-being and development of all human beings and to do so without discriminating on the basis 
 
93 See s 3 of the LRA.  
94 See s 1 (b) of the LRA. 
95 n 91 above. 
96 Grogan (n 38 above) 23.  
97 A peace treaty that ended World War I.  
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of race, gender or colour.98 This is reflected in the Constitution of the ILO99 where the preamble 
states: 100 
“Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice; 
And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of 
people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an 
improvement of those conditions is urgently required; 
Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other 
nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries.” 
The preamble of the ILO’s constitution reflected the ILO’s mandate and primary objectives and a 
strong notion of universal social justice and peace. The ILO had a tripartite nature in which 
representatives of government, workers and employees sit on all committees and structures to 
further the idea of an international labour agenda.  
At the time of the formation of the ILO and drafting of its constitution, South Africa was a country 
plagued with apartheid.101The system’s racial policies eventually made their way to the ILO’s focal 
debate point in 1959 and the credentials of the country’s delegation where called into question.102In 
1961, the International Labour Conference adopted a resolution for the withdrawal of South Africa 
from the ILO due to the government’s apartheid policies. The resolution advised the ILO’s 
governing body to withdraw South Africa until it abandons the apartheid policy.103Following 
proposals made calling on the ILO to amend its constitution to specifically provide for suspension 
and expulsion of member states from the organization and the 1963 decision by the ILO’s 
governing body to appoint a committee to deal with questions concerning South Africa, the South 
African government in 1964, gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the organization and it 
so withdrew for 30 years.  
 
98 Erasmus and Jordaan “South Africa and the ILO: towards a new relationship” 1993/1994 SAYIL 65 66.  
99 Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, 1919.  
100 Drafted in 1919 by the labour commission 
101 Lingaas “The crime against humanity of apartheid in a post-apartheid world” 2015 Oslo Law Review 86 94. 
102 (n 7 above) 23.  
103 (n 10 above) 71. 
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During the time of South Africa’s withdrawal, many international labour standards were set and 
once the country rejoined, it ratified most of the standards, including the 8 core standards. 
 
4.2.2   The inherent job requirement according to the ILO 
The term ‘inherent job requirement’ originates from the ILO’s Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention.104Article 1 of the convention shares similar ideals to s 6 of the EEA and 
s 187(1)(f) of the LRA.  The article prohibits any distinction, exclusion or preference on the bases 
of race, colour, sex, opinion, national extraction or social origin which has the effect of nullifying 
or impairing on the equality of opportunity or treatment in the employment.105Article 1(2) 
empowers employers with a defence, stating that it is not discrimination if the distinction, 
exclusion or preference is based on the inherent requirements of that particular job. The convention 
does not mention fairness or unfairness as concepts. This is different to our law because fairness 
forms the basis of any discrimination claim. A complainant, according to South African law may 
approach the court or the CCMA if they believe they have been unfairly discriminated against 
based on the grounds listed in legislation or on arbitrary grounds. The first point of departure is 
determining whether there was discrimination which is unfair. An employer may use the defence 
of inherent job requirement to justify a claim for ‘unfair discrimination’ and not merely 
‘discrimination’. The onus on the employer is to prove that the discrimination was fair, and not to 
dispute the existence of the discrimination when raising this defence. 
This is not the same notion found in the ILO standard. The convention only prohibits 
discrimination and not unfair discrimination. It seems that based on this approach, an employee 
may raise a claim for discrimination in the workplace, based on the listed grounds in article 1(a) 
or other arbitrary grounds in terms of article 1(b) after consultation with employees and employers 
organisations where relevant. Once there is discrimination alleged, without going into an enquiry 
into its fairness or unfairness, the employer can raise the defence of inherent job requirement to 
dispute the existence of discrimination and not the unfairness of it. The convention is an old 
 
104 n 49 above. 
105 Article 1(a) of the Convention (n 100 above). 
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standard that needs to keep up with the times. It may not have been relevant to discuss matters of 
fairness in 1958 but it certainly is in 2019.  
 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
The ILO perhaps needs to take notes from South African labour legislation with regards to 
discrimination in the workplace and how it can be dealt with. Granted, even South African 
legislation has its shortfalls in this matter, but it provides better protection to the employees than 
the ILO. The employment relationship requires a balancing of interests and any labour law that 
seeks to achieve this balance must do so by considering the inherent inequalities that underlie the 
relationship. The convention offers protection to employees by prohibiting discrimination and 
promoting equal opportunity and treatment, however, it is also easy for the employer to dispute a 
claim of discrimination. Firstly, the convention only lists a few grounds upon which discrimination 
is prohibited, any other grounds may be raised after consultation with other body organizations. It 
will be difficult, based on this provision to allege discrimination on any other grounds other than 
the ones listed in the article, which on their own are very limiting. Secondly, the convention does 
not define what an inherent job requirement is. This is problematic because it is left to the employer 
to decide, which gives such employer even more power in a relationship where they are inherently 
in a position of power. The convention must be amended to include discrimination on more 
grounds such as sexual orientation, marital status, age, pregnancy, gender, HIV status etc. These 
are grounds that speak to current crisis in the workplace and the forms of discrimination that 
employees face. The convention must also include a requirement of fairness, that discrimination 
may only be justifiable if it is deemed fair. It will not suffice that there merely be discrimination, 
but there must be unfair discrimination which the employer must justify as being fair.  
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4.3 Lessons from foreign jurisdiction 
4.3.1 Introduction 
As foreign approaches are employed in South African case law to try and interpret the concept of 
inherent job requirement. It is useful to briefly look at some available foreign case law.106This part 
of the comparative chapter will look at Australian law, particularly case law dealing with 
discrimination and the inherent job requirement as a defence.  Some parts of Australian legislation 
will also be looked at. 
 
4.3.2 Legislative provisions under Australian law 
The inherent job requirement in Australia is dealt with in the Disability Discrimination 
Act.107Section 21A(1) of the Act does not make it unlawful for a discriminator (employer) to 
discriminate against an aggrieved person (employees) on the ground of disability of the aggrieved 
if the discrimination relates to certain work108 and; because of such disability, the aggrieved person 
would be unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the particular work even if the employer 
made adjustments for the aggrieved person.109Other factors such as the aggrieved person’s 
training, qualifications, experience, performance in the job, and other reasonable factors are taken 
into account.110Furthermore, the Act does not consider it unlawful to discriminate against a person 
on the ground of disability if avoiding that disability would impose an unjustifiable hardship on 
the discriminator.111The Workplace Relations Act112encourages the prevention and elimination of 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, colour, sexual preference, age, physical or mental 
 
106 McGregor “The inherent requirements of a job as a justification for discrimination” 2002 Juta’s Business Law 171. 
107 135 of 1992. 
108 s 21A(1)(a) of the Disability Discrimination Act. 
109 s 21A(1)(b) of the Disability Discrimination Act. 
110 s 21A (2) of the Disability Discrimination Act. 
111 s 21B of the Disability Discrimination Act. 
112 86 of 1988 as amended. 
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disability, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin.113 
Australian labour legislation, like the Workplace Relations Act (WRA) embodies similar notions 
of anti-discrimination as South African legislation like the LRA and the EEA. These pieces of 
legislation prohibit discrimination based on similar grounds. The EEA and the LRA list more 
grounds than the WRA. The WRA does not specifically mention HIV status as a ground of 
discrimination but could be an arbitrary ground on the basis of physical disability, which is a listed 
ground in the Act. It is quite progressive that the WRA lists mental disability as one of the grounds 
upon which discrimination is prohibited. No such ground exists in the South African context even 
though one third of all South Africans have mental illness.114Maybe it is also time that mental 
health and/or mental disability be expressly listed in the EEA and LRA. 
The legislation in Australia speaks of unlawfulness whereas in South Africa, we are concerned 
with unfairness when it comes to labour relations. We do not speak of unlawful dismissals, 
unlawful discrimination or unlawful labour practices but the test is that of fairness. Looking at the 
LRA as the principle labour legislation in South Africa which regulates various labour matters 
including unfair dismissals. When a complainant alleges unlawful dismissal, that will fall outside 
the scope of the LRA and may have to be dealt with using common law remedies. However, when 
unfair dismissal is alleged, the courts will look at remedies in the LRA for any LRA breach.115The 
absence of any reference to unlawfulness in this regard is telling, it suggests that if a complainant 
wishes to raise unlawfulness of a dismissal in the LRA for example, they must categorize it as an 
unfair dismissal.116 
The Disability Discrimination Act makes it clear that it is not unlawful to exclude a person from 
employment based on their disability if they cannot perform the tasks required even after an 
employer has made adjustments for the aggrieved person. This is the principle of reasonable 
accommodation. It requires employers to take positive steps to modify the working environment 
 
113 (n 112 above) at s104.  
114 Sunday Times (06-07-2014) 1.  
115 Steenkamp v Edcon Limited 2019 ZACC 17 par 76. 
116 James and another v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2017 38 ILJ 2269 (LAC) par 107. 
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or job to enable a prospective employee or existing employee who has a protected attribute such 
as a disability tom comply with the requirements of the job.117 This duty is not explicitly implied 
in s 6 of the EEA when dealing with discrimination. However, s 2 of the EEA imposes a duty on 
employers to promote equal opportunity in the workplace through the elimination of unfair 
discrimination. Promoting equal opportunity must include taking measures to reasonably 
accommodate employees who do not meet the inherent requirements of a job because of a 
protected characteristic.   
 
4.3.3 Relevant case law 
4.3.3.1 Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie118 
The respondent is Mr. Christie (Christie) was employed by the appellant, Qantas Airlines Limited 
as a captain on international flights from 1964 until 1994.  He was discharged of his employment 
in accordance with the respondent’s policy known as Rule 60 which required that pilots may not 
continue to be in service after the age of 60. Christie then commenced proceedings in the Industrial 
Relations Court of Australia alleging that the termination of his employment was in breach of s 
170DF(1)(f) of the Industrial Relations Act (the Act)119 and he sought reinstatement and 
compensation as remedies. 
Section 170DE (1) of the Act prohibited an employer from terminating an employee’s contract 
without valid reason(s). It held that a valid reason for termination of the employment contract must 
relate to the employee’s conduct, capacity or the employer’s operational requirements. The Act 
also prohibited the termination of an employment contract on certain grounds including 
age,120however, it also held that these grounds can also be reason for the termination of 
employment if based on the inherent requirements of the position.121At all stages of the 
 
117 Klinch et al Employment Equity Law (2001) 7-3. 
118 1998 193 CLR 280. 
119 86 of 1988 now the Workplace Relations Ac 1996. 
120 s 170DF(1)(F) of the Act (n 119 above). 
121 s 170DF (2) of the Act (n 119 above). 
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proceedings, it was accepted that Christie’s age was the reason for the termination, or at least it 
was one of the reasons. Qantas argued that it did not terminate the respondent’s employment 
contract but rather that his employment came to an end through the effluxion of time which was 
in terms of his contract.  
Gray J sitting in the full bench took the view that an inherent requirement should be something 
essential to the position rather than something imposed on it. On the same bench, Marshall J was 
of the view that the term ‘inherent requirements’ must apply where there is a clear and definite 
relationship between the inherent or intrinsic characteristics of the employment and the 
‘discrimination’ which disqualifies the person from being able to perform the tasks required in the 
specific position. The court held that the expression should be construed narrowly because it is an 
exception to the prohibition on termination on discriminatory grounds and that a broad 
interpretation would be in contravention of the purpose of legislation to prevent discriminatory 
conduct. 
The Court held that the requirements of the particular position relied upon had to be inherent in 
that they must involve permanent features of the position and not features that vary in time and 
place. It was held that “the age of sixty” could not be described as "permanent". The evidence 
showed that the retirement age for Qantas pilots had varied over time, including by the increase 
from 55 to 60 years during Captain Christie's service.  
 
4.3.3.2 X v The Commonwealth of Australia122 
The appellant in this matter is X, who in 1993 enlisted in the Australian Regular Army. Prior to 
his enlistment, X had acknowledged that he would undergo medical testing for HIV, and Hepatitis 
B and C post entry and that if he tested positive to any of the three conditions, he would be 
discharged of his duties in the army.123Once he was recruited, he began his training which included 
drill and physical training. Shortly after the commencement of training, he was given a blood test 
which he tested HIV positive for.124He was then discharged of his duties in accordance with a 
 
122 1999 HCA 63. 
123 (n 122 above) par 11. 
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Policy established in 1989 called the Policy for the Detection, Prevention and Administrative 
Management of HIV infection.125 
Following his discharge, X lodged a complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission in accordance with s15 of the Disability Discrimination Act which prohibits 
discrimination in employment unless based on the inherent requirements of the job. X alleged that 
his discharge from the army upon testing HIV positive amounted to unlawful discrimination.126 At 
the Commission’s enquiry, the commonwealth did not contend that X was unable to carry out the 
inherent requirements of being a soldier within the constrains of s 15 because he was physically 
unable, due to his medical condition, to dispense with his duties. Evidence provided by medical 
professionals showed that X was at a stage of HIV infection where he did not suffer from any ill 
effects or symptoms and was in excellent health thereof. The Commonwealth instead argued that 
X posed the risk of infecting other soldiers.127 
The commissioner held in favour of X and substantiated that X had been unlawful dismissed from 
the Army. 
Dissatisfied with the commissioner’s finding, the Commonwealth applied to the full court of the 
Federal court. The court held that inherent requirements of employment could include factors other 
than the employee’s physical ability to carry out the tasks required but it involves considerations 
of health and safety issues of others. The court found it necessary to assess whether this would 
pose a real risk to others. It recommended some factors that the commissioner would have had to 
consider, including, the degree of risk, consequences of the risk being realized, the employer’s 
legal obligation to co-employees and others, the function performed by the employee in the 
employer’s business and the organization of the employer’s undertaking.128The matter was 
remitted to the Commission for further determination.  
 
125 (n 122 above) par 13. 
126 (n 122 above) par 14. 
127 (n 122 above) par 15. 
128 (n 122 above) par 43.  
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By special leave, X then appealed the matter to the High Court of Australia. Considering all the 
facts above, the court found that the commissioner did not make an error in law. It found that the 
military has frequently enforced universal and discriminatory policies under the auspices that they 
are essential to the discharge of their mission.129 Most of these policies are found by the courts to 
be unnecessary and inflexible. The universal exclusion of recruits on the grounds of HIV is one 
such example.130 
The court held that the matter should be remitted to the commissioner for an order. The decisions 
of the Full Court and the Federal Court were set aside, and the appeal was allowed with costs.131 
 
4.4 Case analysis 
There are conflicting views amongst judges even in Australia on how to deal with the issue of 
discrimination in the workplace and whether it can be justified on the basis on inherent job 
requirement. Looking at both judgments, the courts have agreed that an inherent requirement of a 
job must be a characteristic that is essential to the performance of the job. They contend that 
performing the tasks and skills required for a particular job is not limited to the physical ability of 
an applicant or an employee but whether, by ignoring, the characteristic, condition or attribute that 
disqualifies them from the job, they would be inadvertently jeopardizing the safety of other 
employees and the general public. In the Christie judgment, the nature of the job involved close 
interaction with the general public, and their safety depended heavily on his ability to perform the 
job. As a pilot, he would be responsible for the safety of the passengers and if he could no longer 
perform his duties as pilot, his passengers would be in danger. It is the balancing of personal 
interests of the aggrieved and the interests of others that raises contention. In this case, Christie 
was alleging that he had been unlawful dismissed based on age as he had reached the retirement 
age as per company policy. It was his argument that his age did not prevent him from flying 
aircrafts to international destinations, despite being over 60 years old. Although the company had 
 
129 (n 122 above) par 167. 
130 (n 122 above) par 168. 
131 (n 122 above) par 169. 
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tried to accommodate him by limiting the places, he could fly to only short distance flights, his 
argument was that this made him financially weaker as there was more money in flying 
internationally. Nonetheless, the court held that he was not able to fulfill the inherent requirements 
of the job even though he was physically fit.  
Although general rules apply as found in the Australian labour legislation, the courts apply a case 
by case assessment to determine each case. In the X v Commonwealth judgment, the courts also 
considered the risk Mr. X (X) would pose to other employees as an HIV positive military recruit. 
Again, a balancing of interests had to be considered. The Commission, Full Court, Federal Court 
and the High Court were not unanimous in their decisions. The Commission found that it was 
unlawful to discharge X from his duties as he was in great health and his HIV infection did not 
cause any ill effects, nor did it prevent him from executing his duties. The Full Court at the Federal 
Court disagreed with the commission and held that he posed a risk to other soldiers and that the 
international obligations of the army, which required them to discharge any HIV positive soldier 
from service bound them. The appeal court agreed with the Commissioner and found that although 
there are other factors other than one’s physical ability to perform the tasks required, this 
requirement was discriminatory and unnecessary. The court found in favour of X. 
The circumstances surrounding these cases are different and the grounds upon which the aggrieved 
persons alleged discrimination are also different. The cases were dealt with based on their own 
merits. The same rule applies in South Africa, in that there is no universal way of dealing with 
discrimination cases, although a general test may be followed. The outcomes always depend on 
the circumstances of that case. Another common thing is that both South Africa and Australia do 
not have a definition in its labour legislation of what inherent job requirements are. They depend 
on the job, tasks and skills required and this is determined on a case by case assessment.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
There are a few lessons to be learnt from Australia but there are also some that Australia can learn 
from South Africa. Firstly, Australian legislation specifically requires employers to take 
reasonable steps towards accommodating employees and prospective employees with disability in 
the workplace. A dismissal based on disability will only be unlawful if the employee failed to  
perform the tasks inherent to the job despite there being measures in place to accommodate them. 
This is not an explicit requirement in South Africa. Although disability discrimination is prohibited 
in the Constitution and in labour legislation, there is no legislative duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation. Such provision is only found in the Code of Good Practice on the Employment 
of Persons with Disabilities. The code states that employers should reasonably accommodate 
persons with disabilities to reduce the impairment of the person’s dignity to fulfil the essential 
functions of the job.132It also empowers employers to consider the cost-effectiveness of 
implementing these accommodative measures. The shortfall, however, is that the code is not 
binding on employers and is merely a guideline which they ‘may’ choose to follow. To address 
this, the LRA and the EEA can be amended to impose a duty of the reasonable accommodation as 
envisaged in the code. 
Secondly, in South Africa there are more listed grounds of discrimination than in Australia. As 
discussed above for example, HIV status is not a listed ground in Australian legislation, however, 
in the X v Commonwealth case, the discrimination was based on HIV status. Of course, some of 
the grounds like language, which we have in South Africa may not seem applicable in the 
Australian context where over 80% of the population speaks English.133Due consideration must be 
had to a variety of grounds that are relevant to today’s global society that is characterized by 
diversity among other things.  
With regards to how Australian courts deal with employment discrimination matters, compared to 
South African courts, there are similarities and there are differences. The two Australian cases 
 
132 Item 6.3 of the Code. 
133 Sawe “What languages are spoken in Australia” 2018 WorldAtlas (http: www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-
languages-are-spoken-in-australia.html (30-10-2019)). 
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discussed above were dealing with unlawful dismissal, or discharge and unlawful discrimination. 
In South Africa, we deal with the unfairness of the matter and not the unlawfulness, although the 
two concepts seem to have similar meanings in the employment relations scope. In South Africa 
the courts also first determine if there was discrimination using the approach in the Harksen v 
Lane134case, or where based on a listed ground, shift the ouns to the employee. In Australia, the 
courts do not go into an enquiry about the discrimination itself, even where it was not on a listed 
ground, for example HIV status. The courts assume the existence of a discrimination once it is 
alleged and so the enquiry is based on the lawfulness or unlawfulness thereof. Similarly, there is 
an enquiry into the fairness of a discrimination in South Africa, because not all discrimination is 
unfair, however, this enquiry is a secondary one. Discrimination is not automatically assumed once 
allege but may be reduced to a mere differentiation.  
The approach adopted by South African courts is more intensive and scrutinizes the allegations 
more. The issue lies in the determination of the inherent job requirements as there is no enquiry 
into the fairness of the requirement itself. Whereas, in Australia, the courts will also look at the 
unlawfulness of the requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 n 64 above. 
                      42 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
There is no universally adopted approach to deal with discrimination in the workplace. 
Discrimination is can take different forms and can often have negative impacts on those it is 
intended to. In the workplace, there must be systems and measures in place to address issues of 
discrimination, this can be in the form of internal company or organization policies that make 
provision for the reporting of discrimination and the procedure to be followed when discrimination 
is alleged. Additionally, these policies must be in line with the Constitution and relevant labour 
legislation. It is important that workplaces are safe environments free from any form of 
discrimination, especially discrimination that is unfair and unjustifiable. Strict enforcement of anti-
discriminatory laws and rules could be useful in ensuring that employees and prospective 
employees are shielded. 
The South African Constitutional and legislative framework allows an aggrieved employee or 
prospective employee to bring forth a claim for discrimination in the workplace by relying on the 
Labour Relations Act if the discrimination led to a dismissal and through the Employment Equity 
Act. The CCMA, and the specialized labour courts have often use the enquiry as established in the 
Harksen v Lane135 case to determine the extent of the claim and if it was mere differentiation or 
discrimination which is unfair. This is coupled by other factors already discussed. There are 
different approaches when the alleged discrimination is based on a listed or unlisted ground in 
legislation and this affects the burden of proof. In South Africa, we are concerned with the fairness 
or unfairness thereof of the alleged discrimination, and is where the defences come in. An 
employer can use defences such as age, affirmative action measures and the inherent job 
requirement to justify a claim of unfair discrimination.  
In this study, we have looked at the origins of the inherent job requirement and scrutinized its 
possible meaning and application. There is no definition in South African labour legislation, and 
 
135 n 64 above. 
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we accepted that a strict application approach is to be followed in this regard. The courts have had 
the opportunity to deal with cases where claims of discrimination had been brought forward and 
where the employer relied on the defence of inherent job requirement. The court’s approach is 
focused on the fairness of the discrimination and not the defence raised, however, maybe it is time 
to consider legal reform to provide for a scrutiny of the defence itself. We need to establish whether 
the set ‘inherent job requirements’ are fair and otherwise reasonable in the circumstances. It is 
possible that employers will use the these ‘inherent requirements of the job’ to perpetuate further 
discrimination that can indirectly discriminate on a group or categories of people. For example, an 
employer can establish that it is a requirement that a prospective employee have their own car for 
an entry level position. However, upon close evaluation, this requirement has the potential to 
exclude a category of people, particularly Black people, who, because of their disadvantaged 
background, would not have been able to afford or have a car before exiting tertiary in order to 
qualify for an entry level job position that requires one to have their own car. Essentially, the 
employer would have disguised discrimination based on race, ethnicity or even social origin by 
labeling it as an inherent job requirement. 
This study considered the regulation of this defence in Australia and found that they are concerned 
with the lawfulness or otherwise unlawfulness of the discrimination. This is in contrast with the 
South African approach which focuses on fairness. However, the scope for discrimination is much 
wider in South Africa than in Australia, for example, there are more listed grounds of 
discrimination in South Africa than in Australia. This could be influenced by the fact that South 
Africa comes from a history of discrimination and this is one of the ways to redress the imbalances 
of the past. 
There is still a long way to go to ensure that discrimination is minimized in the workplace. South 
Africa, through the EEA and the LRA has addressed many of the challenges faced by employees 
and has tried to balance the interests of both employer and employee. There is no perfect balance 
because the employment relationship is inherently unequal however, both parties can rely on 
legislation and the Constitution for the enforcement of their rights. 
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